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Using detailed daily information covering 100 countries and an event-study approach, we
estimate the short run effects of implementing Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs) on
the spread of the COVID-19 virus at the early stages of the pandemic. We study the impact
of two NPIs –stay-at-home requirements and workplace closures– on three outcomes: daily
residential and workplace mobility; the daily growth rate of cases; and the daily growth rate
of fatalities. We find that immediately after NPIs were implemented, mobility declined by
0.2 standard deviation (SD), and two weeks afterwards it was down by 0.7 SDs. 25 days after
the NPIs were implemented, the daily growth rate of cases and deaths was lower by 10%
and 8.4% respectively. Our results reveal that between 53 and 72 percent of the reduction of
the daily growth rate of cases and deaths associated with a reduction of mobility is caused
by NPIs.
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On the 31 December 2019, the World Health Organization was informed by Chinese health
authorities about unknown viral pneumonia cases in Wuhan, in the province of Hubei. Since
then, the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 (or COVID-19 hereafter) has spread quickly all over
the world. By January 22th 2021, more than 98 million cases were reported worldwide, causing
more than 2 million deaths.1 Since the beginning of the COVID-19 epidemic, almost all countries
have implemented measures to mitigate COVID-19 consequences. Because at the outset of the
epidemic there was no vaccination available, and on the other hand, no medicine have been
encountered to be totally efficient against the COVID-19 yet, governments had to rely on
the so-called Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions (NPIs). Basically, these mitigation strategies
consist in reducing social interactions by limiting mobility in order to slow down the spread of
the virus and avoid the collapse of healthcare systems. In this research we study the short-run
effects of the two most common NPIs implemented, stay-at-home requirements and workplace
closures, on both mobility and the epi-curve.
There is no doubt that social distancing policies have contributed to deepen the economic
outcomes by slowing down the domestic production process. Due to the economic recessions ob-
served in most countries, which are partly caused by lockdown policies (Alfaro et al., 2020), and
acknowledging that several waves of lockdown can be expected to control the virus resurgence
and its variants, it is crucial to have a better understanding of these social distancing policies
impacts on the epi-curve. Indeed, while most countries have undertaken NPIs with the explicit
objective to alter the epi-curve despite the almost certain dramatic economic repercussions, it
is worth to remark that very little is known about their real sanitary impacts.
We use country-specific daily information on cases and deaths from COVID-19, measures of
daily residential and workplace mobility, and the exact date in which countries first implemented
NPIs to estimate the effect of these policies on the spread of the virus at the early stages of the
pandemic. In particular, we compare mobility trends, the growth rate of COVID-19 cases, and
the growth rate of COVID-19 deaths before and after the implementation of either stay-at-home
requirements or workplace closures, focusing on short windows around the time each policy was
enacted for the first time. Our focus on short-run effects of NPIs upon the arrival of the virus
1Numbers taken from the Center for Systems Science and Engineering (CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University
(JHU).
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allows us to avoid confounding the impact of these measures with other interventions made over
time, such as improvements in the capacity of the healthcare system, testing capacity, or even
learning about how to better treat the disease.
The variation we use for identification comes from cross-country differences in the date
in which the NPIs were implemented within geographically defined regions, which are mostly
determined by the arrival date of the virus to each country. We first show that there is a very
strong negative correlation between the date of the first reported case or death and the time
it took a country to implement NPIs. Countries were the virus arrived later benefited from
observing the experiences of those hit early, and implemented NPIs much sooner. We further
show that differences in the speed of the policy response at the outset of the pandemic are
unrelated with observable characteristics that might be predictive of a faster policy reaction,
and varied only as a function of the arrival date of the virus. Since the global spread of the virus
was very fast and happened mostly over a period of a few weeks in the month of March, we
argue that differences in the exact date in which the virus arrived to a country within a region
is plausibly exogenous. To support this assumption, we provide evidence that the identification
assumption holds from the absence of policy effects prior to the policy implementation, which
implies parallel pre-treatment trends.
There are three main takeaways from our results. First, there is a sharp increase in residential
mobility, a measure of the time spent at home, and a decline of workplace mobility, immediately
after the implementation of NPIs. We first show that mobility was already changing prior to the
implementation of the NPIs, but that this trend was accelerated once the policies were enacted.
For example, the day after the stay-at-home requirements were imposed, residential mobility
increased on average by 0.20 standard deviations; three days after it was up by 0.44 standard
deviations; and by day 15 the effect peaked at 0.7 standard deviations. We observe effects of
a similar magnitude but of opposite direction when looking at workplace mobility, and similar
effects as well when considering workplace closures. This suggests the NPIs did have a strong
effect in limiting social interactions at the early stages of the pandemic.
Second, there is a significant reduction in the rate of growth of daily cases and deaths from
COVID-19 after NPIs are implemented. Ten days after stay-at-home requirements are imposed
the growth rate of cases is estimated to be 6.1% lower; 15 days after the growth rate is 8.6%
lower; and by day 25 the growth rate is 10.0% lower. There is also a significant reduction in the
2
rate of growth of daily deaths by COVID-19, although the effects appear with a lag, something
that is expected given the incubation period of the virus. By day 20 after NPIs are imposed,
the daily death rate is lower by 6.1%, and by day 25 the rate is down by 8.4%. Given that that
we are dealing with daily growth rates, these estimates suggest that NPIs have the capacity to
slow-down the spread of the virus very rapidly, effectively flattening the epi-curve in the short
run.
The third main takeaway concerns the effect of mobility on the rate of growth of cases
and deaths in the short-run. The mechanism through which NPIs flatten the epi-curve is by
reducing mobility and thus lowering the probability of social interactions and thus of contagion.
But our data, as well as other studies (Cronin and Evans, 2020), indicate that mobility started
to slow down in countries that imposed lockdowns before the implementation of such policies.
To measure correctly the impact mobility on public health outcomes, we need to disentangle the
fraction of the mobility reduction that is spontaneous, i.e. that would have occurred without
the different NPIs adopted, and the fraction that can be imputed to NPIs’ implementation.
For this, we use our reduced-form estimates of the impact of NPIs on mobility to scale the
overall effect of mobility on the daily growth rate of cases and deaths, in what is analogous to
a two-step instrumental variables approach.
Our results show that a decline of one standard deviation in the mobility index leads to
decline in the daily rate of change of cases 20 days afterwards of between -15.2 and -20.8
percent, depending on the NPI and the mobility index considered. Furthermore, a decline of
a similar magnitude in mobility leads to a fall in the daily rate of change of deaths 35 days
afterward of between -6.2 and -8.6 percent. These results imply that between 53 and 72 percent
of the reduction of the daily growth rate of cases and deaths associated with changes in mobility
are accounted by the effect of NPIs.
2 Literature review
A rapidly emerging literature has begun to analyse the short-run health effects of NPIs and
social distancing policies over the world, with a regional or a cross-country perspective.
Born et al. (2020) conduct a counterfactual lockdown scenario for Sweden applying a syn-
thetic control group method applied to 30 countries of the European Union. They consider a lag
of one month after lockdown and find that counterfactual Sweden did not differ from the actual
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infection dynamics observed in Sweden. They suggest that impact of lockdowns is limited due
to the voluntary precautions taken by people. However, Cho (2020) with a similar approach but
considering a longer lag find that lockdowns have been effective, suggesting that infection cases
in Sweden would have been reduced by almost 75 percent with stricter containment policies.
This finding is interesting but this longer lag complicates the causal identification since the
COVID-19 policies have not been randomly assigned, and, in some cases, governments’ policies
were in direct response to specific epidemiological conditions. Due to that, we rather focus on a
shorter lag and we use a mobility indicator as instrument variable. It is worth to remark that,
despite we consider a shorter length, our results go to a similar direction than Cho (2020).
Dave et al. (2020) study the impact of Shelter in place orders (SIPOs hereafter) between
March 19 and April 20, 2020, in 40 States plus the District of Columbia on health outcomes.
They use using daily State-level social distancing data from SafeGraph (population movement
data set recorded from smartphones) and apply a difference-in-difference estimation. Their
results show that adoption of SIPO was associated with a 5 to 10 percent increase in the rate
at which State residents remained in their homes full-time. These authors address the potential
endogeneity by using data on testing from the COVID Tracking Project. After three weeks
following the adoption of a SIPO, they find that this mobility reduction is associated to a
cumulative COVID-19 related cases drop by 44 percent even though this average impact masks
important heterogeneity across States. In particular, they point out that benefits obtained
from SIPOS’ implementation is higher for early adopters and high population density States.
Regarding mortality, they find a reduction but disclaim none of these estimates are statistically
distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. Differently, our cross-countries approach reveal
that lockdowns policies are associated to lower mortality.
Dave et al. (2020) use more comparable data than us since their geographical analysis
are based at a regional or country levels. They take advantage of their country approach to
measure the impact of NPIs on mobility reduction, and in turn, on health outcomes. As Born
et al. (2020) and Cho (2020), we focus on cross-country data. Thus, we benefit from a higher
heterogeneity, but at the same time, we have to be more cautious on variables measures to
ensure their comparability.
Our approach stands out of the previously cited articles since we rely on a worldwide panel
analysis to assess the average impact of NPIs on the growth rate of the COVID-19 related cases
4
and deaths. We restrict our analysis to stay-at-home and workplace closure policies. We rely on
a flexible approach without relying on hypothesis on some parameters of the epidemic dynamic
that is influenced by behavioural issues that are difficult to control. Using restrictive countries
and times fixed effects allow us to dismantle an important part of country’s and epidemic
dynamic’s heterogeneity. Finally, focusing on the short-run impact of the NPIs allows us to use
the discontinuity of the mobility induced by those policies as an instrument variable.
3 Data
We use three main sources of data for the analysis. First, we take the country-specific daily
number of COVID-19 related cases and deaths from the publicly available reports of the Euro-
pean Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). The ECDC collected this information
on a daily basis from reports from health authorities worldwide, screening more than 500 rel-
evant sources. The data is validated using the ECDC’s standard epidemic intelligence process
designed to detect and assess current and emerging threats to human health from communicable
diseases. The sample contains information for 182 countries between January 1 and July 19 of
2020. We limit the time span of the analysis because our focus is on the effect of NPIs at the
outset of the epidemic in each country. By mid-May, the virus was already present in all the
countries in our sample.
Second, we use data collected by the Oxford COVID-19 Government Response Tracker (Ox-
CGRT) on 19 indicators of government responses, including containment and closure policies,
economic policies, and health system policies. The data is collected from publicly available
sources such as news articles and government press releases and briefings. These are identified
via internet searches by a team of over one hundred Oxford University students and staff. Ox-
CGRT records the original source material so that coding can be checked and substantiated
(Hale et al., 2020). The data includes daily records on new policies implemented, as well as
those that remained active, in each country, as well as a measure capturing their degree of
stringency.
To keep the analysis manageable, we focus on the two most common, encompassing, and
potentially more economically disruptive NPIs implemented across the sample of countries:
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stay-at-home requirements and workplace closures.2 Stay-at-home requirements are supposed
to prevent people from leaving their homes, with minimal exceptions like daily exercise, grocery
shopping, and “essential” trips. Workplace closures are requirements to close (or work from
home) all-but-essential workplaces (e.g. grocery stores, doctors). We restrict the analysis to
countries that had implemented either stay-at-home requirements (100 in total) or workplace
closures (96 in total) at some point during the sample period. Two caveats are worth to stress.
In some cases, the measures are implemented at a sub-national level, but not at the country
level. In those situations we record the policy as being active for the entire country. If the NPIs
are effective, this could potentially introduce an attenuation bias to our estimates. Second,
the degree to which the policies are enforced might differ across countries. If the policies are
implemented but in practice there is no enforcement, they might be less effective. Yet, this
would potentially introduce an attenuation bias to the estimates, and indicate that the effects
might be better interpreted as an intention-to-treat effect.
The third source of data is Google’s COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports. Using
anonymised data provided by apps such as Google Maps, the company has produced a reg-
ularly updated dataset that shows how populations’ movements have changed throughout the
pandemic. In particular, the dataset contains measures of visitor numbers to specific categories
of location like workplaces, grocery stores, parks, and train stations. It also includes a measure
of the duration of time spent at the place of residence, called residential mobility. Each mea-
sure is constructed as a daily index defined relative to a baseline value that is specific to each
geographical location and day of the week. Baseline days are meant to represent a normal value
for that day of the week and are defined as as the median value over the five-week period from
January 3rd to February 6th 2020.
We focus on two mobility measures in our analyses: residential mobility and workplace
mobility. These two measures have a direct relation with the two NPIs considered, stay-at-
requirements and workplace closures, so that they are likely to be the most responsive to these
two policies. Moreover, work and home are the two places that people are most likely to visit or
spend time on a regular basis, so that they can adequately capture changes in mobility patterns.
Note that by the way it is defined, an increase in residential mobility should be interpreted as
2Other NPIs recorded in the data set include school closures, cancelling of public events, closures of public
transportation, restrictions on movements across regions or cities, and international travel controls. Although we
limit the analysis to two NPIs, countries that implemented one of the measures usually implemented a subset of
them at the same time. The cross-policy implementation correlation is above 0.6, and in many cases is above 0.8.
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an increased in the time people spend at their residence, which in turn indicates an actual fall
in mobility. Hence, NPIs are expected to increase residential mobility but decrease workplace
mobility.
4 Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions, Mobility, and the Early Spread of the
Virus
The outbreak of COVID-19 was first identified in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, and spread
rapidly across neighbouring countries, but it was in March that the pandemic became truly
global. The virus spreads rapidly, but countries where the virus arrived later benefited from
observing the experiences of those hit early. A sign that countries were learning about the impact
of the pandemic is that policymakers began to implement NPIs much sooner after the arrival of
the virus, and in some cases even before there were fatalities. On average, the time between the
first reported case in a country and the implementation of stay-at-home requirements was 22
days, but having one extra day without the virus reduced the response time by 0.65 days. For
example, countries with reported cases in January and February took on average 40.2 days to
impose an NPI, while countries with the first reported case after the beginning of March spent
only 16.1 days.
We classify countries in three groups according to the date of the first COVID-19 related
death: i. early affected (before February 29); ii. affected during the period of rapid expansion
(first three weeks of March); and countries in which the virus arrived later (after March 24th).
Given the exponential growth of the virus, if NPIs are effective, the speed of the policy response
plausibly had significant effects on the speed of contagion in each country, at least in the short
run. Figure ?? presents suggestive evidence that this was the case. The figure shows the relation
between the date of the first COVID-19 related death in each country and the log cumulative
number of deaths 30 days after. There is a clear negative relation between the timing of the
arrival of the virus and how deadly it was by the end of the first month: having one extra day
without the virus is associated with a decline in the log cumulative number of deaths in day
30 of 4.2 percent. The arrival time of the virus is then closely linked to the speed of the policy
response and the supposed fatality rate of the virus at the beginning of the pandemic.
NPIs can affect the spread of the virus by reducing interactions among individuals and
thus lowering the probability of contagion, however, the efficiency of NPIs to do so remains
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an empirical question. To explore this channel, we use country-specific daily information from
Google mobility data on mobility patterns to approximate social interactions and social dis-
tancing. Figure 1 shows the evolution of residential and workplace mobility before and after the
first implementation of either stay-at-home requirements or workplace closures, averaged across
countries. To facilitate interpretation, the mobility indexes are normalised so that they take a
value of zero at the date each policy was implemented in each country and have a cross-country
variance of one. We focus on a short period around the date of the policy implementation:
between 10 days prior to and 25 days afterward the policy was implemented. Our emphasis is
then on the immediate impacts of NPIs on mobility. There are two immediate takeaways from
Figure 1. First, the patterns of mobility started to change before NPIs’ were implemented. In
other words, individuals had already reduced their mobility even before formal restrictions had
been applied. Second, there is an acceleration of the reduction of mobility exactly at the time
the policy was implemented. In that sense, NPIs at early stages reinforced a pattern that was
already in place.
The descriptive evidence presented in this section shows that i. countries where the virus
arrived later implemented NPIs sooner after the arrival of the virus; ii. the implementation of
NPIs is associated with a significant reduction in mobility, and hence in social interactions; and
iii. countries where the virus arrived later had lower death rates during the initial stages of the
pandemic. These three pieces of evidence suggest that NPIs could have been effective in slowing
the spread of the virus, at least in the short run. In the next section we test this hypothesis
and provide quantitative estimates of the effect of implementing NPIs on both mobility and
mortality in the short-run.
5 The Short-Run Impact of NPIs on the Spread of the Pandemic
Our empirical strategy is that of an event study design, where the event is the implementation
of an NPI. For each country, we compare mobility trends, the growth rate of COVID-19 cases,
and the growth rate of COVID-19 deaths before and after the implementation of either stay-
at-home requirements or workplace closures. We focus only on short windows around the time
each policy was implemented for the first time, from 10 days before to 25 days afterwards.
This short length of time allows us to avoid confounding the impact of NPIs with other policy
interventions made over time, such as improvements in the capacity of the healthcare system,
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testing capacity, or even learning about how to better treat the disease.
More formally, let c index countries and t index time, measured in days. Time runs from
-10 to 25, where we fix t = 0 in each country at the date when the policy was implemented for
the first time. We analyse the effect of the stay-at-home requirements and workplace closures
separately, and in each case we restrict the sample to the countries that implemented the NPI
at some point between January and July 2020.




φmi 1[i = t] +
25∑
i=1







where Mobilityjc,t is the normalised mobility index j, either residential or workplace mobility;
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1[·] is an indicator function that takes the value of one if the condition inside the square brackets
holds; ηmr,d is a region
4 × calendar day fixed effect; and µmc is a country fixed effect. The
parameters of interest are the φmi ’s. These parameters capture differences in mobility at each
day relative to the baseline defined at t = 0, conditional on the structure of fixed effects. Thus,
the estimates of φmi for i ∈ [−10,−1] provide a test of the parallel trends assumption; while the
estimates of φmi for i ∈ [1, 25] identify dynamic effects of the NPIs on mobility.
The variation we use for identification comes from cross-country differences in the date
in which the policies were implemented within a region, which we take to be exogenously
determined by the arrival date of the virus, once time-invariant country characteristics are
accounted for. As shown in Figure ??, the spread of the virus across countries was very fast and
happened mostly over a few weeks in the month of March. Within regions, the exact date in
which the virus arrived at a country was plausibly random. Moreover, once the virus entered,
how fast governments imposed NPIs varied as a function of the arrival date (see Figure ??), but
it was not correlated with observable characteristics that might be predictive of a faster policy
reaction. For example, Table 1 shows that variables like population size, population density,
GDP per capita, the share of older and more vulnerable populations, and aggregate indicators
of health status are not correlated with how fast NPIs were implemented. We provide further
evidence that the identification assumption holds from the absence of policy effects prior to the
3Mobility indexes are normalised so that they take a value of zero at the date each policy was implemented
in each country and have a cross-country variance of one.




Panels (a)-(d) of Figure 2 show the estimated effects of the two NPIs on the mobility in-
dexes. The top panels focus on residential mobility, while the bottom panels focus on workplace
mobility. In all cases, the evidence suggests that the parallel trends assumption holds: we
cannot reject that the patterns of mobility prior to the implementation of the NPIs followed
a common trend across countries within a region. This is true even though mobility started
to change before the implementation of the policy (see Figure 1). It must be said that even
though mobility started to change before the implementation of NPIs, our estimates account
for changing mobility prior to their implementation, and thus our parameter estimates identify
the additional change in mobility generated by the policy.
Specifically, we estimate how residential mobility changed almost immediately after the NPIs
were implemented. The day after the stay-at-home requirements where imposed, residential
mobility increased by 0.20 standard deviations; three days after it was up by 0.44 standard
deviations; and by day 15 the effect peaked at 0.7 standard deviations. These values indicate
substantial changes in mobility patterns. We find that workplace closures had a similar effect on
residential mobility, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Moreover, the patterns of workplace
mobility mirrors those of residential mobility: the timing of the effect coincides, and, given the
uncertainty of the estimates, the magnitudes are not statistically different. All in all, our results
provide clear evidence that these two NPIs had substantial effects on mobility, which lowers the
probability of contagions by reducing social interactions.
We then estimate the reduced-form effect of NPIs on both the rate of growth of daily
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25∑
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where ∆Log Casesc,t is the daily change in the total (log) cumulative number of cases, and
∆tLog Deathsc,t+15 is the daily change in the total (log) cumulative number of deaths at t+ 15
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days. The 15 days lag is intended to account for the fact that the incubation period of COVID-
19 can take up to 14 days, so one would expect most critical cases appeared after this period.
When defining this lag we are being overly conservative, since most fatalities occurred after two
weeks. Moreover, most cases had not been reported at the moment of contagion, but we expect
that they also started to appear in the data with some lag, once symptoms appear or people
get tested. The specification of the event study allows us to study these dynamics.
Panels (a)-(d) of Figure 3 show the estimated effects of the two NPIs on the daily growth rate
of cases (panels (a) and (b)) and deaths (panels (c) and (d)). In all specifications, the evidence
suggests that the parallel trends assumption holds: we cannot reject that the rate of growth
of cases or deaths prior to the implementation of the NPIs followed a common trend across
countries within a region. We estimate that stay-at-home restriction lowered the average rate
of growth of daily cases, but the effect is only statistically significant at the five percent level after
a lag of between 10 to 15 days (see Panel (a) of Figure 3). Ten days after the implementation
of the policy the daily growth rate of cases is estimated to be 6.1% lower; 15 days after the
implementation the daily growth rate is 8.6% lower; and by day 25 the growth rate is 10.0%
lower. We observe a sharper decline in the growth rate of cases after the implementation of
workplace closures (see Panel (b) of Figure 3). Ten days after the implementation of the policy
the growth rate of cases is estimated to be 11.1% lower; 15 days after the implementation the
growth rate is 15.2% lower; and by day 40 the growth rate is 19.4% lower.
We also observe a sharp decline in the daily rate of COVID-19 related deaths, but, as
expected, the effect also appears with a lag. Up to 19 days after the implementation of stay-at-
home requirements, we do not observe any statistically significant changes in the fatality rate,
although the point estimates are all negative (see Panel (c) of Figure 3). By day 20, the daily
death rate is lower by 6.1%, and by day 25 the rate is down by 8.4%. A similar pattern is
observed after the implementation of workplace closures, although we only observe statistically
significant declines in the daily death rate at the five percent level after 30 days (-5.2%) (see
Panel (d) of Figure 3). The evidence then strongly suggests that NPIs flattened the epi-curve
in the short-run, successfully reducing the speed in which the virus spread at the early stages
of the pandemic.
We can combine the three reduced-form estimates from Equations 1-3 to study the effect
of mobility, more broadly, on the rate of growth of cases and deaths in the short-run. The
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mechanism through which NPIs flatten the epi-curve is by reducing social interactions and thus
lowering the probability of contagion. In that sense, we can think of Equation 1 as a first-stage
regression in an instrumental variables estimate of the effect of mobility on the rate of growth
of cases and deaths. To see this more clearly, consider the equation:









where αzj captures the effect of changes in mobility at time t on the daily growth rate of cases
at time t+ j. We allow the effect to appear with a lag since the evidence from Figures 2 and 3
suggests the response of mobility and cases to NPIs is not immediate. All other variables are
defined in an analogous way to the previous models. Replacing Mobilityc,t in Equation 4 with
the right-hand side of Equation 1, and simplifying the expression, we get





φmi 1[i = t]








1[i = t] + ηr,d + µc + εc,t.
(5)
Here, αzj ×φmi captures the reduced-form effect of NPIs on the daily growth of cases at t = i+j.
This is equivalent to the estimate of φxi+j in Equation 2.





i . Following a similar procedure and analogous notation, the effect of mobility on








1[i = t] + ηr,d + µc + εc,t,
(6)




i captures the effect of changes in mobility at time t on the daily growth
rate of deaths at time t+ 15 + j.
Yet, the estimates show that a decline of one standard deviation in the mobility index leads
to a decline in the daily rate of change of cases 20 days afterwards of between -15.2 and -20.8
percent, depending on the NPI and the mobility index considered (see Table 2). This is quite
a significant effect, especially considering how fast the virus spreads. Furthermore, a decline
of a similar magnitude in mobility leads to a fall in the daily rate of change of deaths 35 days
5ηr,d ≡ αzjηmr,d + ηzr,d; µc ≡ αzjµmc + µzc and εc,t ≡ αzj εmc,t + εzc,t.
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afterward of between -6.2% and -8.6%. Again, these are quite substantial numbers.
Finally, we can compare the reduced-form effect of NPIs on daily growth rate of cases and
deaths with the overall effect of mobility on those same outcomes. This comparison provides
an estimate of the relative importance of NPIs in driving the mobility effect. Our results
imply that between 53 and 72 percent of the reduction of the daily growth rate of cases and
deaths associated with changes in mobility are accounted by the effect of NPIs. Even if the
behavioural response by individuals is strong in the absence of lockdown policies, these measures
have a substantial role in flatting the epi-curve.
6 Conclusion
Measuring the impact of NPIs during this pandemic of COVID-19 is complex since we still face
a lot of uncertainties about this virus, and on the other hand, this impact crucially depends
on people behaviours in response to the pandemic and governments’ mitigation measures. We
provide evidence that NPIs implemented during the initial stages of the pandemic had an
immediate effect on mobility, and reduced the daily growth rate of cases and deaths in the short
run, effectively flattening the epi-curve. We claim that these results can be useful since we may
face several waves of this virus and its variants and governments, national as well as local ones,
are likely to adopt a new batch of NPIs to control the virus spread.
Our results must be interpreted cautiously thinking about new peaks of the pandemic. First,
even though we still face a lot of uncertainties about this virus, we know more about it than
eight months ago. Second, this better knowledge has contributed to improve the efficiency of
some treatments, in particular for severe cases. Even though it may not affect the variable that
measures the number of cumulative cases, partly thanks to that, we observe that the mortality
rate is lower now than six months ago. Third, due to the economic consequences that generate
lockdowns, it is unlikely to observe NPIs taken at a national scale. Thus, this type of analysis
should be replicated at a local level.
Finally, for identification purpose we limited our analysis to a reduced length of time. How-
ever, it would be interesting to evaluate NPIs impact with a longer length, since short term
victories do not necessarily guarantee the best outcomes for countries at the end of the pan-
demic. On the one hand, the interplay between economics and public health has to be taken
into account, and beyond the pure public health aspects, life quality also matters. On the other
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hand, even if one wants to strictly focus on public health, several researches shine a light on
lockdowns consequences from a sanitary point of view. For instance, in United Kingdom, a
report of the National Health Service indicates that lockdown may cost 200,000 lives for the
next years. We believe that it is necessary to include our positive results regarding lockdowns’
short term impacts in a longer and broader perspective. It is part of our research agenda.
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7 Tables and Figures
Figure 1: Mobility index before and after implementations of NPIs
Mobility Residential
(a) Stay-at-home (b) Workplace closing
Mobility Workplace
(c) Stay-at-home (d) Workplace closing
Note: Authors’ calculations are based on Google mobility data and the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School
of government responses tracker.
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Figure 2: Mobility Index and Policy Response
Mobility Residential
(a) Stay-at-home (b) Workplace closing
Mobility Workplace
(c) Stay-at-home (d) Workplace closing
Note: Standard errors clustered by country. 95 percent confidence intervals reported around each point
estimate. Mobility indexes taken from Google mobility data. Mobility indexes are normalised so that they
take a value of zero at the date each policy was implemented in each country and have a cross-country variance
of one. Dates in which NPIs are implemented taken from the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of
government response tracker.
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Figure 3: Change in Log Cumulative Deaths or Cases
Cases
(a) Stay-at-home (b) Workplace closing
Deaths
(c) Stay-at-home (d) Workplace closing
Note: Notes: Standard errors clustered by country. 95 percent confidence intervals reported around each point
estimate. Cases and fatalities taken from the European Center for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC).
Dates in which NPIs are implemented taken from the University of Oxford’s Blavatnik School of government
response tracker.
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I II III I II III
Speed of Policy Response
Date First Death -0.699*** -0.749*** -0.813***
(0.139) (0.139) (0.146)





Log(GDP pp) -1.831 -4.235
(2.148) (3.192)
Population Density -0.013 -0.014
(0.009) (0.009)
Share of Population 70 Years or Older -0.277 -0.059
(0.523) (0.603)
Mortality Rate Cardiovascular Disease 0.009 -0.001
(0.009) (0.009)
Prevalence of Diabetes in Polpulation -0.102 -0.105
(0.257) (0.254)
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100
R2 0.626 0.658 0.707 0.639 0.681 0.706
Region FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Notes: The speed of policy response is measured as the number of days between the first reported COVID-19
death/case in each country and the implementation of stay-at-home requirements.
18











of NPIs on mobility
at t+ 10
(φm10)
0.535 -0.516 0.715 -0.669
Reduced-form effect
of NPIs on rate of change
of cases at t+20
(φx20)
-0.081 -0.082 -0.138 -0.139
Reduced-form effect
of NPIs on rate of change
of deaths at t+35
(φd35)
-0.044 -0.044 -0.045 -0.045
Effect of mobility
on rate of change
of cases at t+20
(αz20)
-0.152 0.159 -0.193 0.208
Effect of mobility
on rate of change
of deaths at t+35
(αw35)
-0.082 0.086 -0.063 0.067
Notes: The table summarises the reduced-form effects of NPIs on i. mobility, ii. rate of change of cases, and
iii. rate of change of deaths for different NPIs and mobility indexes used in the estimation. The last two rows
provide estimates of the overall effect of mobility on the rate of change of cases and deaths.
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